Abstract
The central puzzle motivating this study is, why did the regime trajectories of India and Pakistan quickly diverge within a decade of their twin independences in 1947? Empirically, both India
and Pakistan seemed equally unlikely to create stable and democratic
regimes. Upon independence, both countries had emerged from an extended
period of British colonial rule with low levels of economic development
and broadly similar state institutions. Both states were governed as
infant democracies under the same legal instrument until their sovereign
constituent assemblies promulgated new constitutions. Both countries
were beset by refugee crises, food insecurity, as well as security
challenges. And both countries were governed by single dominant parties
that were supported by multi-class coalitions and which had some
experience governing at provincial levels prior to independence.
Yet, within a decade of their independence, the regime trajectories of India and Pakistan had radically diverged. India
promulgated a constitution enshrining elections based on universal
adult franchise, held national elections in the context of full civil
and political liberties, and installed an elected chief executive.
Pakistan's constitution-making process stalled, with its sovereign
constituent assembly being twice dismissed by an autocratic chief
executive, and with eight national administrations cycling through power
with increasing rapidity until the military coup of 1958 formally ended
its tentative democratic experiment. These different regime
trajectories involved variation in both regime type as well as regime stability.
Drawing on elite interviews, an extensive analysis of colonial
government records and party documentation, among other sources, I show
how the most common explanations for democratization, such as low levels
of economic development or high levels of inequality, cannot
convincingly account for these divergent outcomes. Instead, I argue that
two inter-related but causally independent variables provide the most
compelling account of the divergent outcomes: the class compositions of
their independence movements and the strength as well as content of
their dominant political party at independence. Class interests had a
powerful but historically conditioned impact on the type of
post-independence political regime each independence movement was likely
to establish. Because a landed aristocracy with disproportionate access
to material resources and social status led its independence movement,
Pakistan was very unlikely to create a post-independence regime which
institutionalized opportunities for the redeployment of resources and
status to other social groups, namely a democracy. Because an urban,
educated middle class with a distinct material interest in creating more
representative political institutions led its independence movement, India was substantially more likely to create a post-independence democracy.
Different social classes were motivated by their class interests to
strategically create political parties of varying strength (along the
dimensions of ideology, alliances, and organization) which directly
impacted the likelihood of post-independence regime stability. First,
the creation of a programmatic nationalism in India made its political party substantially more able to broker state-building compromises (providing for regime stability ) while the content of Indian nationalism meant that its regime was likely to be a democracy. Second, while the pursuit of class interests led to an alliance between segments of the middle class in India,
the same pursuit in Pakistan led to the creation of an alliance between
a landed aristocracy and a peasant movement, an alliance with
diametrically opposed redistributive interests. Stable, shared
redistributive interests within its alliance meant that India's
dominant political party was better able than Pakistan's to broker
state-building compromises after independence, thus providing for regime
stability . Third, while India's
independence movement created a centralized and disciplined party
organization, Pakistan's independence movement remained a top-heavy
party organization with little institutional independence from its
charismatic leader. Upon independence, the presence of a centralized,
representative intra-party organization in India
meant that its dominant political party was more able to quickly and
decisively broker state-building compromises after independence,
providing for regime stability.
This
dissertation provides an original explanation for a puzzling divergence
in regime outcome which remains insufficiently explained by extant
scholarly literature on democratization. The argument developed here
highlights that while regime outcomes hinge on redistributive conflicts,
that social groups choose alliances, espouse ideologies, and build
political institutions in response to a status quo distribution of
power. Once created, these political institutions can affect, sometimes
deeply, group understandings of whether democratization and regime
stability is desirable.
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