Thursday, 25 July 2013

Why DNA scares you?

In his seminal article Honourable Mr. Justice Dr. Khalid Masud analyses the evidentiary value of DNA in order to establish the criminal act of rape. He finds that there is no Islamic legal justification for rejecting DNA as circumstantial evidence in rape cases. This view is supported by various ahadith and opinions of classical jurists of various schools of thought. This begs the question that why did Council of Islamic Ideology refuse to endorse the evidentiary value of DNA in rape cases? 
 
Dr Masud argues that these are the powerful who are scared of being punished in case DNA is used to prove the crime of rape. This, he argues, is done by confusing zina (consensual intercourse) with zina bil jabar (rape):

“Rape is commonly confused with Zina in Muslim patriarchal societies in general, and in Pakistan in particular to save the mighty from shame. Thanks to the sectarian and religious political affiliations, one need not refer to the original teachings of the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet because that might scare the mighty.”

He further elaborates this point by contending that in order to deny the evidentiary value of DNA, the “mighty and the scared” employ two principles:

1. They refuse to distinguish between rape and fornication. They call the first Zina bil Jabr and the second Zina, implying that there is no concept of rape in Islamic law; and
2. They insist on requiring four pious and God fearing male eyewitnesses in rape cases.

As it is impossible for a victim of rape to produce four such witnesses in order to establish the crime of rape, the perpetrators of this heinous crime are acquitted even when they are prosecuted in a court of law.

Dr Masud shows that Zina is clearly distinguished from rape and concludes:

“It is not therefore correct to claim that Islamic legal tradition could not develop the concept of rape and that is why Pakistani jurists do not distinguish between rape and cases of fornication (Zina). Studying hadith and Fiqh one finds that the Islamic legal tradition did not require four witnesses as primary and mandatory procedure for rape; they frequently accepted circumstantial evidence.”

He then goes on to quote various ahadith and juristic opinions in order to endorse his above views. He concludes his article with the following observation:

“In societies where rape is used for intimidation, disgrace, humiliation and subjugation, it is in the interest of the mighty to confound rape with Zina. It raises doubt about the intent and involvement of the victim of rape. Even victim’s family abandons her and pleads her to keep quiet. In some cases, she is silenced in the name of family honour.”

This is an excellent piece of scholarship, which combines learning of classical Islamic legal texts with sociological knowledge—a rare but desperately required combination in order to remove the grave injustices done to the weaker and vulnerable sections of Muslim societies in the name of Islam. It is unfortunate that the mighty, whose powers should have been curbed by law and religion, exploit the both in order to subdue the weak and the poor.

Written in the context of infamous Mazar e Quaid rape case, Dr Masud’s article has laid down the foundation of a new research methodology. Its further application by other researchers and scholars will expose the vested interests behind the whole project of ‘political exploitation of Islamic law’.

Read the full article of Dr Khalid Masud at:

Monday, 6 May 2013

Book Review: The Impossible State by Wael B. Hallaq—Some Preliminary Reflections

Book Review: The Impossible State by Wael B. Hallaq—Some Preliminary Reflections

The thesis of this book is that “Islamic State” judged by any standard definition of modern state is ‘both an impossibility and a contradiction in terms’. It is asserted that moral-legal system based on divine sovereignty is essential for Islam as much as sovereignty is essential for the modern state. Therefore, there can be no Islamic state (p51). Hallaq argues that the paradigmatic ‘Islamic governance’ does not differentiate between the legal, the moral, and the mystical. This makes it a misfit within the structure of not only the modern state but also the globalised world dominated by capitalism and corporations (pp137-8)

Students of political science would notice that the doctrine of sovereignty was a historical construct. It was the result of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the religious wars in Europe and restricted the powers of Roman Catholic Church to interfere in the matters of European states. As sovereignty is a supreme authority which need not be absolute, and the rise of supra-national organisations such as the UN, EU and WTO have restricted the powers of nation states, it is not very hard to imagine that an Islamic state could be sovereign within the limits of Sharī‘a.

Apart from political science, Hallaq engages with other disciplines of social science and humanities. This book is a fascinating piece of scholarship interwoven in an interdisciplinary jargon and only a scholar of Hallaq’s stature could have produced it. As a revisionist scholar, Hallaq is credited for not only breaking open the so called closed gates of Ijtihād, but also bringing down ‘Schacht’s castle’ about the origins of Islamic law. I find this work quite impressive, however, my main concern is about its teleology. But before I present my reflections, it is advisable to first explore this masterpiece.

After setting its premises in chapter 1, chapter 2 sets out to define the Modern State.  It is followed by chapter 3 which establishes contradiction and confusion in the theory of Separation of Powers in the first part of this chapter. In the second part, the author argues that the term “Islamic State” is anachronistic and rather prefers the use of “Islamic governance” for the historical phenomenon that has been described by other scholars as “Islamic State”. He then describes the Islamic moral-legal system, which according to him, is based on complete separation of powers between the legislature and executive. He argues that Islamic “legislators”—muftīs represented the community and successfully put a check on rulers’ powers. He challenges the thesis of Oriental despotism and ends this chapter with the assertion that “Sharī structures” provide for John Rawl’s “well ordered society” in which citizens have a shared sense of justice (pp72-3).

If the first half of the book builds up to show how “Islamic governance” is perfectly suited to the models of ‘rule of law and democracy’, the second half is dedicated to establish that “modern state” is an impossibility under Islamic modes of governance. Thus chapter 4 shows that the separation of law and morality under Western tradition along with the rise of new-Hobbesian political state has made it incompatible with the norms of Sharī‘a. This theme is further developed in chapter 5. Here it is shown that how modern state controls citizens through not only techniques of surveillance but also through the provision of education and other public services. This is contrasted with the “Islamic governance” that is based on the “technologies of self” which do not differentiate between the moral, the legal and the mystical.

Chapter 6 extends the analysis and argues that in a globalised world primarily based on capitalist economy, “Islamic governance” based on moral principles is an impossibility. Hallaq also provides a critique of corporations from Islamic perspective. He attributes the absence of juristic personality under Islamic law to the morality of Sharī‘a because had the corporate form been tolerated it might have led to unwarranted consequences. To support his argument, he refers to the English government’s banning of corporations in the sixteenth century [should be eighteenth century] on the basis of “moral sanity”, which did not last long. (p154)

The final chapter reiterates the main thesis of the book by arguing that the modern state is not a ‘neutral tool of governance’, which could be used to achieve the moral objectives of Sharī‘a. The book ends on an elegant note that the moral problems posed by modernity are not simple challenges for Muslims alone, rather the whole world shares these challenges.

Hallaq’s thesis appears to present an incisive critique of modernity and Western liberal democracy. However, its subtext challenges the political Islam. Since an Islamic state is an impossibility, and Sharī‘a is incompatible with the very notion of the state, the whole point of a political organisation based on the principles of Sharī‘a is preposterous. Sharī‘a is based on moral principles and it requires an individual to comply with its injunctions voluntarily and with the intention of obedience to God, therefore, any system of governance based on authoritative sanctions is antithetical to Sharī‘a.

In order to strengthen and persuasively argue his thesis, Hallaq had to conflate some historical facts. First, he had to magnify the peculiarity of modern state and portray it as a distinctive European phenomenon. One may ask, if state is a unique European construct, so is the ‘law’. It follows that if pre modern Muslim political models of governance cannot be called ‘state’, likewise, Sharī‘a could not be translated as law. Hallaq accepts this but yet still he describes Muslim jurists ‘muftis’ as legislators—the representatives of civil society. Perhaps more problematic is his account of Islamic judicial system which is shown to be an exclusive domain of Sharī‘a. In this account, Sharī‘a is an all encompassing and all embracing code which deals with minute details of every aspect of life. This ahistorical depiction of Sharī‘a is contrary to Hallaq’s observations in his earlier work ‘Sharī‘a: Theory, Practice and Transformation’, where he notes, ‘Islamic law depended, in both theory and practice, on the cooperation of customary (‘āda, ‘urf) and royal law (siyāsa shar‘īyya).' (p368 italics original). In this work, however, both custom and imperial law are shown to be subservient to Sharī‘a.

The subtitle of the book is ‘Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament’. However, what is conspicuously missing is any reference to the writings of the proponents of ‘Political Islam’. One finds a few references to Syed Qutub. Khomeini is also mentioned in a footnote, and so is the Brotherhood of Egypt. However, Mawdudi is significant only by his absence. This is intriguing since any discussion on the issue of Islam and state remains incomplete without Mawdudi’s contribution in this field, despite its being unorthodox. Likewise, the absence of any reference to leading Muslim philosopher Muhammad Iqbal renders the otherwise highly sophisticated work deficient.

Despite above observations, this is a remarkable piece of work and undoubtedly it will help generate a healthy debate about the relationship between Islam and modern state. It is thought provoking and has succeeded in raising the questions which would grapple with the minds of both students and accomplished scholars.

Friday, 26 April 2013

Impact of Common Law and Civil Law on the Personal Law of India

English and French Approaches to Personal Laws in South India, 1700-1850 by Anselmo Francisco Trinidad Reyes, PhD Law Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1986
 
Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the extent to which different legal traditions, common and civil, influence the articulation of personal laws.

It contributes towards the study of development of personal or minority law institutions by common or civil law courts today.

This thesis finds that difference in legal traditions did not play any major role in the articulation of personal laws. They developed roughly in identical fashion aside from a few discrepancies. For instance, both the English and the French applied the prohibition of usury in India, but under different motives. The English because of sensibilities of the Hindu, and the French because of their inspiration by the canon law prohibition of usury.

Theoretical Framework: Autonomy v Functionality of law
In The Evolution of Law, Professor Watson argued that economic, social and political conditions have no direct effect on the direction of legal change. Lawyers in civil and common law tradition are by nature conservative. Hence, this is the logic of legal tradition which ultimately determines the nature and extent of legal change.

Dr Washbrook’s model of Anglo-Hindu law, articulated in his famous article, ‘Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India’, is diametrically opposed to this view. He argues that the needs of the East India Company had direct bearing on the way the law was interpreted and developed in India.

Conclusion
English and French laws reached to the same conclusion, though through different methods. Factors external to legal traditions played a part in reducing discrepancies between the two legal systems. The French relied upon English legal literature because of their meagre financial resources. The English, on the other hand, relied upon Roman law.

Selected Excerpts
‘The plurality of legal sources implies a degree of uncertainty within the legal system. That uncertainty gives the judges room to manoeuvre in the articulation of legal principle.’ pp384-5

‘Textbook writers are less constrained than judges in that they pick and choose themselves, from varied laws available, the principles they wish to articulate. Judges must react to what is offered them in argument by the parties to a dispute…’ p386

‘Finally, one cannot discount the influence of similar economic, political and social pre-occupations in adjacent settlements, leading to similar perceptions and solutions.’ p392

Sunday, 24 March 2013

Politicians v Judges


On the 5th of August 1775 Raja Nandakumar was hanged, after being found guilty of forgery by the newly established Supreme Court. He was tried a few days after having brought charges of corruption against the Governor-General, Warren Hastings. A year before that, the Supreme Court had been established by the English Crown to restrain the exercise of power by the officials of the East India Company. In order to maintain the autonomy of the Supreme Court, the judges were directly nominated by the Crown. 

After their appointment, the judges started to entertain suits against the officials. In one case, they even ordered the arrest of powerful members of the Provincial Council for illegally taking over the property of a complainant. Because of this, tensions arose between the Supreme Court and the Governor-General, who accused the activist judiciary for putting British rule in India at risk. He argued that by imposing their authority on revenue officials, the judges usurped the sovereignty of the Company. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, insisted on the difference between the public responsibilities of the officials and their use of official powers for private gains. The Chief Justice, Sir Elijah Impey rebutted the charge that the Supreme Court exceeded its authority by claiming that the Supreme Court represented the people of India.

Notwithstanding the hostility between the judiciary and executive, Governor-General Hastings acknowledged the role of the Supreme Court in the Indian political system. After all, it was the Supreme Court which had averted a coup against him when a member of the Council threatened to take over the garrison at Calcutta because of dissension in the Council. This was a partial reason behind the Chief Justice Impey’s accepting the position of a judge in the Company’s highest court, Sadr Diwani Adalat. He received an extra salary for this position, though it jeopardised his impartiality as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In Macaulay’s words, acceptance of an additional office made him ‘rich, quiet and infamous’. 

Historians recognised Impey’s significant contribution towards improving the operation of the Company’s courts. However, his services were cut short when he was dismissed from his office as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for accepting a salary from executives of the East India Company, to whom he was required to control as a judge. Later, he was impeached for the judicial murder of Raja Nandakumar but was found not guilty.

Finally, a solution for this executive-judicial tussle was found by appointing the Chief Justice along with one judge and a barrister as the members of the Governor-General’s Council in 1853. In this way, the conflicting executive and judicial powers were merged into the one body of the executive council. This did not stop various Chief Justices from taking an activist judicial role in holding executive officers to account and providing relief to people against the government. When the judicial system was reorganised, the Supreme Court was abolished. For the next hundred years until Independence in 1947, there was no Supreme Court in India. Appeals from the decisions of various High Courts were made directly to the Privy Council based in London, though a federal court was established in 1937 with limited powers regarding constitutional cases.

This story is illustrative of the fact that a discord between the executive and judiciary is inevitable. There could be two alternate solutions. First, by making the system more representative, which could legitimate the authority of parliament over the judiciary. Second, by increasing executive power, which could supersede the judiciary, though nominal representation of judges could be accepted as part of the executive. The first option was adopted in England and the second in colonial India. There was, however, an interim solution to this convoluted problem of executive-judicial tussle: ‘soften’ the hearts of judges by providing them with additional perks. Recent events show that the successors of the first Supreme Court in South Asia are still in the ‘interim period’ on either side of the border in both India and Pakistan. Meanwhile, Hastings and Impeys prosper, while Nandakumars suffer!



Monday, 11 February 2013

Legal Realism and the Supreme Court of Pakistan


In 1895, the New York Legislature unanimously enacted the Bakeshop Act, which prohibited individuals from working in bakeries for more than ten hours per day or sixty hours per week. Joseph Lochner, owner of a bakery, was fined on a charge that he violated the Act by employing a worker for extended hours. After losing his appeal at the New York Court of Appeal, he took his case to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court, by a vote of 5–4, ruled that the law limiting bakers’ working hours violated individual liberty and constituted an illegitimate exercise of state power. With this decision began the Lochner era, in which a right wing majority of judges in the Supreme Court issued several controversial decisions, invalidating federal and state statutes that sought to regulate working conditions of labourers such as fixing of minimum wages.

One of the dissenting judges in the Lockner case was Oliver Wendell Holmes, a famous American Legal Realist. He challenged the age-old notion of law as written rules in the books of law, and argued that law is what the courts say it is. Legal Realists argued that law is an empirically testable phenomenon, the same as the laws of nature, e.g. the law of gravity or the law that water boils at 100 c. Therefore, it must be predictable and certain. In reality, this is not exactly the case. Law, as lawyers and judges understand it, has a human aspect to it. It is not objective and can never be so. Legal Realists argue that if that is the case, then judges should admit that they take into account other things along with the law while deciding disputes. They assert that judges should not pretend to be bound by law in books. Rather they should admit the reality that their behaviour as judges is influenced by extra legal factors. That is why Scandinavian Legal Realists bring psychology into their analysis of law. Prominent legal theorists, such as Austin, Hart, Kelsen, Dworkin, Raz and Finnis, recognise the humanist aspect of law, from the point of view of both the judges as officials and citizens as subject of law.

Human beings unlike machines are not immune to the social environment surrounding them. Therefore, an expectation that legal rules should be like the laws of nature and should be applied mechanically is unrealistic. But equally unrealistic is the view that written laws are irrelevant when courts decide cases. American Legal Realism was a reaction to the arbitrary decisions of the US Supreme Court. It wanted transparent judicial reasoning, rather than the ideological inclination of judges to be the foundation for court decisions.

Judges of the superior courts of Pakistan are well aware of Legal Realism. Former Chief Justice of Pakistan Justice Munir is still despised for handing down a blank cheque to Ayub Khan for the ‘successful’ revolution under Kelsen’s Pure Theory of law. However, our courts have come a long way from 1958 to 2009. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has publicly buried the infamous doctrine of necessity for good. It would be ironic if the same Supreme Court might appear to usurp the legislative powers of the parliament under its pretentious power of interpretation of the Constitution and statutes. It was this Supreme Court which lay down the idea of the balance of powers against the well-established doctrine of the separation of powers. The role of the Supreme Court is vital in order to ensure that this balance is struck, though other stakeholders could not be absolved from their responsibilities. Let that justice should be done, but what an awful thing it would be if it should bring down the heavens. Heavens are based on balance and justice is at the core of this balance. Justice is not justice if it is not impartial and is not based on sound principles.

Friday, 1 February 2013

CHANGING ROLE AND IMAGE OF JUDICIARY IN PAKISTA FROM 1988 TO 1999 by Parvez Ahmed, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan

Abstract
The objective of this is to examine the role of superior judiciary in Pakistan after 1947. We have mainly focused on the controversial role of the judiciary during the period 1988-1999. It is popularly believed that after the independence Pakistan's judicial system was established closely on the footsteps of the English system. In the early years the judiciary of Pakistan enjoyed independence in deliverance of justice. Afterwards, most of the governments resorted to unconstitutional method to pressurize the judiciary for its ulterior motives. All the three constitutions provided constitutional guarantees to judiciary for independence but the executive's always pressurize it in legal way such as through abuse of power of appointment, parallel hierarchy of courts (Federal Shariat Court, Anti-Terrorists Courts, Military Courts), and amendments in the constitution for curtailing the powers of judiciary. Both democratic and undemocratic regimes used the shameful and blatant methods on the issue of appointments. From 1988 to 1999, five assemblies were dissolved almost on the charges of corruption, inefficiency and were challenged in the Supreme Court. On every occasion, the decision of judiciary was different. Therefore we have focused our analysis on the role of superior judiciary and how its controversial judgments had affected its image. It is important to emphasize that the controversial role of the superior judiciary cannot be examined in isolation from the over all political environment prevailing in the country. Therefore our thesis has been divided into various chapters and each chapter has been used as background to create the necessary link between the past and the present.

Access full text http://eprints.hec.gov.pk/2474/1/2360.htm