Wednesday, 19 May 2021

Conjoined Twins: Human Rights and Islam in the Constitutional System of Pakistan

 Ever since Pakistan’s creation as an independent state in 1947, Islam has continued to permeate its constitutional and legal system. From the confines of the personal law of Muslims at the time of independence, Islam has become the grundnorm of Pakistan’s constitutional system.[1] Curiously, the gradual elevation of Islam in the formal legal system of Pakistan has coincided with the rise of human rights in constitutional texts and judicial precedents. The joint progression of Islam and human rights in the legal system of Pakistan may surprise a number of authors who associate human rights with secularism and are suspicious about the coexistence of Islam and human rights in the legal systems of contemporary Muslim states.[2]

Indeed, the rise of “Islamic human rights jurisprudence” in the judgments of the Shariat Courts of Pakistan in 1980s and 1990s “surprised” legal commentators.[3] These courts articulated the principles of natural justice such as due process and human liberties in the language of Islamic legal principles such as ʿadl (justice), qisṭ (fairness), and iḥsān (equity). My research on the constitutional and legal role of Islam in Pakistan suggests that the correlation between Islam and human rights dates back to the time when Pakistan was established as an independent state in 1947 and has persisted ever since.

At the time of independence, Pakistan adopted the Government of India Act 1935 as an interim Constitution. Since the British Parliament had passed the Act, it was unlikely to assign a constitutional role to Islam in the political order in which Muslims were a minority. But more surprisingly, the Act did not contain any fundamental rights of citizens either. Therefore, Pakistan’s first Constitution promulgated in 1956 adopted a variety of fundamental rights. The Constitution made these rights justiciable and declared that the laws, existing or future, which contradict fundamental rights were void. The Constitution also declared that the laws repugnant to Islamic injunctions would be void but this provision was not justiciable; rather, an advisory Commission was established to make “recommendations” for taking measures to bring “existing laws into conformity with the Injunctions of Islam.”[4] This Constitution firmly established fundamental rights and granted Islam a symbolic role in the political system. The Constitution, however, did not last long. In October 1958, the army commander, Ayub Khan, abrogated the Constitution and imposed martial law.

Pakistan’s second Constitution adopted in 1962 illustrates that Islam and fundamental rights are closely connected. This Constitution did not assign a symbolic role to Islam in the legal system unlike the 1956 Constitution. The 1962 Constitution renamed the country as the “Republic of Pakistan” instead of the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” and tuned down the “Islamic repugnancy clause” by replacing the specific expression “injunctions of Islam” with a more broad and ambiguous expression “teachings and requirements of Islam.”[5] This marginalization of the role of Islam in the 1962 Constitution coincided with a weaker position of fundamental rights. The Constitution enshrined fundamental rights but did not make them justiciable. Fundamental rights were made justiciable when the Constitution was amended to give symbolic value to Islam, by renaming the country as the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”[6]

A similar relationship between human rights and Islam is evident in Pakistan’s third Constitution adopted in 1973 and in its subsequent amendments.[7] The 1973 Constitution restored certain provisions of the 1956 Constitution that related to fundamental rights. It declared the laws inconsistent with fundamental rights to be void and made such rights enforceable through courts. At the same time, the Constitution also declared Islam as the “state religion” and provided that “all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah… and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions.”[8] This provision is not justiciable and the Council of Islamic Ideology is established to “advise” the legislature on “any question referred to the Council as to whether a proposed law is or is not repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam.”[9]

During the martial law rule of Zia ul-Haq, the 1973 Constitution was suspended along with the fundamental rights enshrined in it. The Zia ul-Haq regime justified the suppression of fundamental rights by enhancing the legal role of Islam through Islamic judicial review. To his dismay, however, the judges of the Shariat Courts exercised the powers of Islamic judicial review to endorse fundamental rights and basic freedoms of citizens by supplanting these rights and freedoms with Islamic legal principles derived from the Qur’ān and Sunnah. Through the endorsement of fundamental rights with reference to Islamic legal principles, the judges of the Shariat Courts realized the potential of Islamic constitutionalism to constrain the executive authority. It is this potential of Islamic legal principles that inspired the judges of the Shariat Courts to enthusiastically embrace Islamic judicial review even when the military regime of Zia ul-Haq actually intended to maintain the status quo through judicial Islamization of laws.

The correlation between Islam and human rights and their mutually reinforcing role in the legal system of Pakistan may confound a number of readers for whom Islamization of laws is closely associated with the Hudood Ordinances and blasphemy laws which adversely affect women, children, and minorities. An evaluation of the judgments of the Shariat Court shows that the judges softened the rigors of “Islamized” state-enforced laws. In doing so, they frequently relied upon Islamic legal principles.[10] In this way, rather than pitting Islam against secularist Western human rights, the judges of the Shariat Courts mitigated political manipulation of Islam with humanitarian and liberal principles of Islam.[11]

The confluence of human rights and Islam in Pakistan’s legal system is a result of its unique colonial and post-colonial contexts. In the historical context of South Asia, human rights and Islam reinforced each other in their mutual stance against colonial rule which denied fundamental rights and freedoms to indigenous people. The British drafters of the Government of India Act 1935, which served as a model for the interim Constitution, had refused to include a Bill of Rights as is included in the American Constitution, which had inspired the nationalist leaders during the independence movement to demand fundamental rights.[12] After independence, while the majority population of Muslims expected a constitutional role for Islam, a significant minority, especially in East Pakistan, demanded constitutional guarantees for their rights. In fact, the Hindu members of the legislature had asked to include a reference to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in the Objectives Resolution of the Constitution.[13] The 1956 Constitution adopted both Islam and fundamental rights to reflect the expectations of the Muslim majority and the demands of the Hindu minority.

Once established under the 1956 Constitution and made justiciable through courts, the effectiveness of fundamental rights as a check on executive authority and as a means to protect the rights of citizens became evident. The marginalization of human rights under the 1962 Constitution led to the formation of an unlikely alliance between Islamists and secularists who forced the military dictator, Ayub Khan, to amend the Constitution to restore the status of fundamental rights as well as Islam. When the Constitution was eventually amended, both Islam and human rights found their place in the constitutional text. The 1973 Constitution was adopted in the aftermath of the secession of East Pakistan which became Bangladesh. This Constitution was inspired by the political ideology of Islamic Socialism of the ruling Pakistan People’s Party. This Constitution promised to eliminate all forms of exploitation and prohibited slavery, forced labor, and child labor while assigning a prominent role to Islam as the state religion.

The above historical snapshot shows that the fate of human rights and Islam has been intertwined in the constitutional history of Pakistan and it continues to be so. By harmoniously construing the various provisions of the Constitution,[14] the judges of superior courts have relied upon Islam and human rights to promote public interest litigation,[15] ensure the independence of the judiciary,[16] restrain executive authority to prosecute alleged offenders of terrorism through speedy trials,[17] protect rape victims from character assassination,[18] promote the rights of disable persons,[19] and save the environment by protecting endangered migratory birds.[20]

Notes:

[1] The constitutional and legal role of Islam has been articulated through the preamble of the Constitution, the Objectives Resolution passed in 1949. It became an operative part of the Constitution through the 8th Constitutional Amendment in 1985.

[2] For details see A.E. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (Routledge 2018); M.A. Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and N.A. Shah, Women, the Koran and International Human Rights Law: The Experience of Pakistan (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006).

[3] I use the expression “Shariat Courts” for the Shariat Benches, the Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench, Supreme Court. Martin Lau, The Role of Islam In the Legal System of Pakistan (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2006), 210.

[4] The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1956, article 198(3).

[5] The Constitution of Republic of Pakistan 1962, articles 6 and 204.

[6] Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1963. The Supreme Court did not wait long to enforce fundamental rights. In 1964, the Court declared the law that banned the activities of Jamaat-e-Islami as unconstitutional on the basis of a violation of the fundamental right to “freedom of association.” Abul Ala Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan, PLD 1964 SC 673.

[7] Pakistan also had an interim Constitution that was adopted in April 1972. It was primarily based on the previous two constitutions of 1956 and 1962.

[8] The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, art. 227.

[9] Ibid, art. 230.

[10] In 1981, the FSC declared the punishment of stoning (rajm) for adultery (zinā) as un-Islamic. Hazoor Bakhsh v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1981 FSC 145. The Zia regime reconstituted the bench of the FSC to reverse this judgment. Federation of Pakistan v. Hazoor Bakhsh, PLD 1983 FSC 255. The FSC clarified that blasphemy is not a wrong of strict liability, in which neither wrongful intent (mens rea) nor culpable negligence is required for liability even when it proposed that death sentence is the only punishment for blasphemy and the alternative punishment of life imprisonment is un-Islamic. Muhammad Ismail Qureshi v. Pakistan, PLD 1991 FSC 10. The Shariat Courts established the principles that a woman can never be guilty of consensual sex (zinā) if she complains of rape at any stage, no matter how belatedly; and that mere pregnancy is not sufficient to convict a woman for consensual sex, especially if she claims that the pregnancy was a result of rape. Moeen H. Cheema, “Cases and Controversies: Pregnancy as Proof of Guilt under Pakistan’s Hudood Laws,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 32, no. 1 (2006): 121. The FSC held that pregnancy alone is not sufficient proof of rape or consensual sex. Juma Gul v. The State 1997 PCrLJ 1291; Mst. Zafran Bibi v. The State, PLD 2002 FSC 1; Noor Zaman v. The State 1998 PCrLJ 476; Mst. Sakina v. The State, PLD 1981 FSC 320; Iqbal Hussain v. The State, PLD 1981 FSC 329.

[11] An evaluation of case law shows that in most cases judges have invoked Islamic legal principles either to reinforce fundamental rights or to expand them. In very few cases, judges referred to Islam to limit fundamental rights. One such case relates to the disqualification of the ousted prime minister Nawaz Sharif to head his political party. Zulfiqar Ahmed Bhutta v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2018 SC 370.

[12] Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 97–98.

[13] Ibid, 59.

[14] In Hakim Khan v. Government of Pakistan, PLD 1992 SC 595) the Supreme Court ruled that Islamic provisions of the Constitution do not supersede other constitutional provisions. In Zaheeruddin v. State 1993 SCMR 1718, the Court held that the Injunctions of Islam may supersede fundamental rights. In a subsequent judgment in Qazi Hussain Ahmed v. General Pervez Musharraf, PLD 2002 SC 853, the Court held that all constitutional provisions “should be read together and harmonious construction should be placed on such provisions so that no provision is rendered nugatory.”

[15] Darshan Masih v. The State, PLD 1990 SC 513 (The Supreme Court enforced the rights of laborers by outlawing bonded labor.)

[16] Govt of Sindh v. Sharaf Faridi, PLD 1994 SC 105 (The Supreme Court ordered the government to separate the judiciary from the executive based on Article 2A of the Constitution, which requires full independence of judiciary to ensure access to the fundamental right to justice.)

[17] Mehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1998 SC 1445 (The Supreme Court held that the admissibility of a confession made before a police officer violates fundamental rights as well as Islamic law.)

[18] The law of evidence under Article 151(4) of the Qanun-e-shahadat Order 1984 provided a right to a male defendant in cases of rape to impeach the character of the alleged victim. The Federal Shariat Court declared this law void on the basis that it violates the principle of gender equality as enshrined in Article 25(2) of the Constitution and provided in the Qur’ān. Capt. (retd.) Mukhtar Ahmad Shaikh v. Government of Pakistan, PLD 2009 FSC 65.

[19] Muhammad Yousaf v. Chairman, Federal Public Service Commission, PLD 2017 Lahore 406 (The Court declared the Rules of Competitive Examination 2014 as unconstitutional because they did not accommodate persons with disabilities in foreign and public administration services.)

[20] Province of Sindh v. Lal Khan Chandio 2016 SCMR 48 (The Court referred to the “environmental teachings of Islam” and the “fundamental right to life and to live with dignity … in a world that has an abundance of all species not only for the duration of our lives but available for our progeny too.”)

This blog post was first published at the Harvard Law School's Islamic Law Blog

Islamic Judicial Review in Practice (3): Sharia and State Law

 The enthusiasm of the Shariat Benches to judicially Islamize laws is best reflected in the judgment of the Shariat Bench of the Peshawar High Court in Mst. Farishta v Federation of Pakistan.[1] In this judgment, the Shariat Bench reviewed the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 (MFLO). Pakistan’s first military ruler, Ayub Khan promulgated the MFLO to reform Islamic family law. The MFLO introduced several reforms to protect the rights of women and children by requiring registration of marriage and divorce, imposing restrictions on polygamy, and providing the right of inheritance to orphaned grandchildren in the estate of their grandfather. A majority of ʿulamāʾ opposed the MFLO for violating Islamic legal rules. So fierce was the opposition of ʿulamāʾ against the MFLO that Ayub Khan protected it against judicial review under the 1962 Constitution. This protection against judicial review for the MFLO was also included in the 1973 Constitution. After the military coup of Zia ul-Haq, ʿulamāʾ were optimistic that the MFLO would be repealed. To their dismay, however, not only did Zia ul-Haq’s regime fail to repeal the MFLO or any of its provisions, but Muslim personal law was also excluded from the jurisdiction of the Shariat Benches. This meant that the Shariat Benches would not be able to review the MFLO. Nevertheless the Shariat Benches reviewed the MFLO and declared some of its provisions as repugnant. The extension of the jurisdiction of the Shariat Benches over Muslim personal law is one of the remarkable features of Islamic judicial review because it shows the ability of the judges of the Shariat Benches to expand their authority over the areas of law that were specifically excluded from their jurisdiction under the Constitution.

In the Farishta case, the Shariat Bench had to cross the double barrier posed to its jurisdiction. First, Article 8(3)b of the Constitution excluded the MFLO from judicial review; and second, Article 203-B of the Constitution specified that Muslim personal law does not include in the definition of “law” that the Shariat Benches were authorized to review. The Bench crossed the first barrier by holding that the Shariat Benches were established through the insertion of Chapter 3-A into the Constitution through a supra-constitutional provision authorized under the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977 and Article 203-A of this chapter gave it overriding effect over other articles by providing that “this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution.”

Crossing the second barrier, however, required an ingenious approach. To examine the MFLO, Chief Justice Abdul Hakeem Khan differentiated two types of Muslim personal law: codified and uncodified. He regarded “Muslim Personal Law” as “Shariat” which is distinguishable from statutory law.[2] He based his argument on the usage of the term “Muslim Personal Law” along with the expression “Shariat” in parenthesis in the titles of several statutes such as the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1937 and the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962. He acknowledged that these statutes made “an inroad” into the Muslim Personal Law, but rejected the view that “a legislation, though it might be affecting the Muslim Personal Law in its fundamental points, would become a part and parcel of Muslim Personal Law, that is to say, Shariat”.[3] Based on this analysis, Chief Justice Khan held:

If the Shariat Benches are to reopen established propositions of Shariat, then they will be opening the Pandora’s box. Instead of implementing the will of the law-giver that Shariat should be applied, they will be frustrating that intention and anxiety [sic]. We are of the considered view that all that the expression “Muslim Personal Law” does convey is that the said law as known to Shariat and not legislative enactments which overrule that law in so far as the subject to which that law was applicable. A thing not known to Shariat cannot be brought into the Shariat by legislation, even though it has got the force of law.[4]

In this case, the petitioner challenged section 4 of the MFLO which provided orphaned grandchildren the right of inheritance. This right is not provided under classical Islamic law of inheritance and seems unjust for depriving vulnerable orphaned grandchildren from the inheritance which might have come to them through their parents had the latter been alive. Chief Justice Khan raised the question that whether this section became part of sharī‘a by its enactment through the legislature. To elaborate this point, he reasoned that if this is the case, then if adoption of children (not recognized under sharī‘a) is validated through a statute, it will become impossible to question its validity with reference to the injunctions of Islam. He cautioned about the risks associated with accepting the proposition that a statute becomes part of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) and is excluded from the jurisdiction of the Shariat Benches which are established to test existing laws on the benchmark of injunctions of Islam. In light of this discussion, Justice Khan concluded that a legal rule will not become part and parcel of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) merely because “it has been added to it by legislation.”[5] Therefore, he reviewed the MFLO and declared its section 4 repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.

The judgment in the Farishta case is important for at least four reasons. First, it exhibits the enthusiasm of the judiciary to Islamize statutory laws by widely construing its jurisdiction. Second, it draws a clear distinction between divine law (sharī‘a) and state law (statutes). Justice Khan emphasized the divine nature of sharī‘a and distinguished it from the statutory law, which may claim to be inspired by sharī‘a but does not become part of sharī‘a merely because of its codification by the state. Third, the judgment declared uncodified divine sharī‘a as the standard to review the validity of statutory law. Finally, and most importantly, the judges of the Shariat Bench claimed this review authority for themselves despite the fact that they are not trained in religious sciences as are ʿulamāʾ.

In appeal, the SAB reversed the judgment of the Shariat Bench in the Farishta case despite partially agreeing with the reasoning in the judgment. Justice Karam Elahee Chauhan observed that the phrase “Muslim Personal Law” has two meanings depending on the context in which it is used: (i) religious or divine law of Muslims that governs matters of their religious faith; and (ii) special statutory laws which apply only to Muslims.[6] He explained that Islamic law is divine because it derives its authority from the Qur’ān and Sunnah, and in the process of Islamization of laws, this Divine Law or Muslim Personal Law is the touchstone against which other laws are to be tested. Therefore, the “touchstone” itself has been excluded from being reviewed. This is exactly what Chief Justice Khan of the Shariat Bench, had held in his judgment. Justice Chauhan, however, drew an opposite conclusion from this characterization of Muslim Personal Law. For him, it was logical to exclude from the jurisdiction of the FSC the “touchstone” because it was already evident that the divine law, for its being a touchstone was already not testable by the Shariat Benches/FSC. Therefore, the only conclusion that could be drawn from the language of Article 203-B of the Constitution is that it means Muslim Personal Law in the second sense, that is, “such codified and legislated law which is applied to Muslim residents of Pakistan as or with the denomination ‘Muslim’ which governs their person as such and as distinct from general law of the land which applies to everyone.”[7]

In 1994, however, the SAB added further nuance to the definition of “Muslim Personal Law” by holding that the MFLO does not fall within the definition of “Muslim Personal Law” because it applies to all Muslims irrespective of their sectarian affiliation, while the objective of Article 203-D of the Constitution is to exclude “Muslim Personal Law” from Islamic judicial review to avoid sectarian conflict.[8] After this judgment, the FSC reviewed the MFLO in 2000 and declared its two sections repugnant: (i) section 4 related to the inheritance right of orphaned grandchildren; and (ii) section 7(3)(5) which provided that a divorce will not become effective until the expiration of 90 days when the notice of divorce is delivered to the Chairman or the end of pregnancy.[9] This judgment has not become effective because an appeal against it has been pending before the SAB for the past two decades.

The expansion in the jurisdiction of the FSC and the SAB through innovative, though legally questionable means,[10] was in line with the general trend of an assertive judiciary that emerged during the demise of Zia ul-Haq’s regime. During the post Zia ul-Haq period, the FSC and SAB have tried to arrogate to themselves an authority that is more expansive than the one envisaged in the Constitution.[11]

Notes:

[1] PLD 1980 Peshawar 47.

[2] Ibid, para 51.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid, paras. 51­–52.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Federation of Pakistan v. Mst Farishta, PLD 1981 SC 120, 122.

[7] Ibid, para. 8.

[8] Dr. Mahmood-ur-Rehman Faisal v. Government of Pakistan, PLD 1994 SC 607. The SAB justified this change based on the Explanation added to article 227(1) of the Constitution, which provides: “In the application of this clause to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression ‘Qur’an and Sunnah’ shall mean the Qur’an and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect.”

[9] Allah Rakha v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2000 FSC 1.

[10] Justice Siddiqui referred to Article 227 of the Constitution which is included in Part IX of the Constitution. This part relates to the Council of Islamic Ideology, which is an advisory body. Therefore, the reliance on this article for the interpretation of the definition of MPL included in Part VII of the Constitution, which deals with the judicature, is problematic from the perspective of the general rules of interpretation of statutes.

[11] In Muhammad Saeedullah Khan v. Secretary, Govt of NWFP Excise and Taxation Department, PLD 2009 FSC 33, the FSC held that it is not bound by the “Injunctions of Islam” as expounded by the Council of Islamic Ideology. In Mian Abdur Razzaq Aamir v. Federal Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, PLD 2011 FSC 1, while examining the Protection of Women Act 2006, the FSC claimed an expansive jurisdiction over a number of offences that were not initially included in its appellate jurisdiction.